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The author
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Opinion
By Ramzy Baroud
'Bizarre and incoherent' could be the most euphemistic way of collectively characterizing many narratives that run from a single development or a trend in history. But sometimes the very opposite happens: precisely the coherence and conformity surrounding a historical development contribute to the distortion of the reality. The so called 'Arab Springs' have come as the best example of the latter phenomenon.
Lumping the developments of the past three years in many countries in West Asia and North Africa into the apparently lofty 'Arab Spring' characterization has made the intellectual exercise of many across the world much less laborious. But what are the prices of such a characterization? How do they lead people to wrong conclusions? In this column, Ramzy Baroud answers these questions precisely but comprehensively.
As
vigilant as one must remain to the many drivels promoted as news in mass
media, one must not fall into the trap of seeing the world through the
prism of an American plot in which we are co-conspirators, hapless fools
or unwilling participants. Arab
revolutions have not failed, at least not yet. It will take us years, or
maybe even an entire generation to assess their failures or successes.
They have ‘failed’ according to our hyped expectations and erroneous
understanding of history.
Challenging the falsehoods and
simplifications that surrounded the so-called Arab Spring from the very
start doesn’t necessarily mean that one is in doubt of the very notion
that genuine revolutions have indeed gripped various Arab countries for
nearly three years.
In fact, the
revolutionary influx is still underway, and it will take many years
before the achievements of these popular mobilizations be truly felt.
One can understand the frustration and deep sense of disappointment
resulting from the state of chaos in Libya, the political wrangling in
Yemen and Tunisia, the brutal civil war in Syria, and of course, the
collective heartbreak felt throughout the Arab world following the
bloody events in Egypt.
But to assign
the term ‘failure’ to Arab revolutions is also a mistake equal to the
many miscalculations that accompanied the nascent revolutions and
uprisings from the start. Many lapses of judgment were made early on,
starting with the lumping together of all Arab countries into one
category – discussed as singular news or academic topics. It was most
convenient for a newspaper to ask such a question as “Who’s next?” when
Libya’s Muammar al-Gaddafi was so pitilessly murdered by NATO-supported
rebels. It is equally convenient for academicians to keep contending
with why the Egyptian army initially took the side of the January 25
revolution, the Syrian army sided with the ruling party, and while the
Yemeni army descended into deep divisions.
In
the rush to emphasize one’s intellectual authority, if not ownership
over the narrative and for political reasons as well, the Arabs were
dissected in every possible way, stretched in every possible direction,
and reduced in ways so useful, yet so flawed, so that quick answers
could be obtained.
While answers were
readily available of why the Arabs revolted, time has proven much of
the early discourses inane and misleading. The direction of these
revolutions has headed in sharply different ways. This a testament to
the uniqueness of circumstances, historical and otherwise, which
surround each country – as opposed to the wholesale representation
offered by the media. It is an argument I made soon after Tunisian
president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country. My argument was a
response to the euphoria of expectations made by media ‘experts’ and
journalists who clearly had little understanding, or dare I say, respect
of history or knowledge about the complex realities in which each Arab
country is situated. Many went on to write books, while others inspired
audiences around the world with fiery speeches about collective Arab
Islamic awakenings even before we conjured up basic ideas of what was
truly manifesting before our own eyes. These manifestations were at
times very violent and involved many players, from Qatar to China, and
groups so varied in roots, ideology and sources of funds.
But
as the plot thickened, much of the distorted accounts of ‘twitter
revolutions’ and such, grew less relevant and eventually faded away.
Take the case of Libya as an example. Those with simple answers,
reflecting truly modest understanding of Arab societies, could hardly
understand the complex nature of Libya’s tribal society, the
socio-economics governing relations between East and West, urban areas
with desert towns, and Libya’s African context and relationships.
When
NATO used the Libyan uprising, mostly in the eastern parts of the
country, to achieve its own political objectives, it converted a
regional uprising into an all-out war that left the country in a status
comparable to that of a failed state. Almost immediately after NATO
declared the Libyan revolution victorious, the excitement over the
Libyan component of the ‘Arab Spring’ became less visible, and
eventually completely dissipated. Since then Libya has hardly followed a
path of democracy and reforms. In fact, the harms that resulted from
the Libyan crisis, such as the massive influx of weapons and refugees to
other African countries, destabilized the entire country of Mali.
As
a result, Mali, too, went through its own upheaval, military coup,
civil war and finally a French-led war in the course of two years.
Unfortunately, these issues are hardly discussed within the Libyan
context since Mali is not Arab, thus such inconvenient stories do no
service to the simplified ‘Arab Spring’ discourse.
The
consequences of the Libyan fiasco will continue to reverberate for many
years to come. But since simple arguments cannot cope with intricate
narratives, media ‘experts’ and other intellectual peddlers have moved
elsewhere, selling the same tired arguments about other Arab countries
by insisting on the same failed, expedient logic.
While
some parties continue to ascribe the same language they used in the
early months of 2011 to these revolutions, the shortcomings of these
revolutions eventually gave credence to those who insist that the ‘Arab
Spring’ was entirely farce—incepted, controlled and manipulated by US
hands, and funds of rich Arab countries. These critics either have no
faith in Arab masses as a possible factor of change in their own
countries, or have been so accustomed to judging the world and all of
its happenings as a colossal conspiracy where the US and its friends are
the only wheelers and dealers.
As
vigilant as one must remain to the many drivels promoted as news in mass
media, one must not fall into the trap of seeing the world through the
prism of an American plot in which we are co-conspirators, hapless fools
or unwilling participants.
Arab
revolutions have not failed, at least not yet. It will take us years, or
maybe even an entire generation to assess their failures or successes.
They have ‘failed’ according to our hyped expectations and erroneous
understanding of history. What popular revolutions do is that they
introduce new factors that challenge the way countries are ruled. In
post-colonial Middle East, Arab countries were ruled through
dictators—and their local associates—and foreign powers. The harmony and
clashes between the dictator and the foreigner determined the course of
events in most Arab countries—in fact in most post-colonial experiences
around the world.
This is where the
real significance of the mass mobilizations in Arab countries becomes
very important, for the ‘people’—a factor that is still far from being
fully defined—challenged the rules of the game and mixed up the cards.
True, they sent the entire region into disarray, but it is the price one
would expect when powerful regimes and foreign powers are challenged by
long-disempowered, disorganized, and oppressed people.
Arab
revolutions have not failed, but they have not succeeded either. They
have simply challenged the status quo like never before. The outcome of
the new conflicts will define the politics of the region, its future,
and the relationships between governments and the upcoming generations
of Arabs.
Ramzy Baroud
is a widely published and translated author. He is an
internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of
PalestineChronicle.com. He has authored several books and contributed to
many books, anthologies and academic journals. His books include
"Searching Jenin: Eyewitness Accounts of the Israeli Invasion" and "The
Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle". His
latest book is "My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story"
(Pluto Press, London). Visit his website: www.ramzybaroud.net.
This article was earlier published in the Asia Times Online and Foreign Policy Journal recently and is reproduced here with permission from the author.
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